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Toll roada b s t r a c t
Choosing a route is a complex task, especially since the roads’ capacities are limited and
road users non-cooperatively seek to optimize their own trip. This article present the
results of three in-laboratory route choice experiments. In all experiments the participants
had to choose repeatedly between a high-capacity toll-road and a toll-free main road. We
investigate the role of pre-trip information on the resulting route usage dynamics. Besides
the absence of a stable equilibrium point (Wardrop’s User Equilibrium), we found that the
participants improve their decisions over the course of time as a result of learning. Addi-
tional information appears only useful if only a limited number of participants possess
such information. Moreover, we found gender-related differences in the observed road
usage patterns: female participants were more likely to choose the toll road than male
participants.
 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Driving a vehicle constantly requires making decisions: should I change lanes? is it safe to accelerate? which route is best
for the home-to-work commute? The latter question is interesting for several reasons: Of course, to some extent it is a ques-
tion of personal preference what constitutes a good trip (Albert, Toledo, & Ben-Zion, 2011; Zhang & Levinson, 2008). Yet,
among the factors affecting the perceived trip quality ‘travel time’ has been found to be the most important one (Hall,
Wakeﬁeld, & Al-Kaisy, 2001; Papinski, Scott, & Doherty, 2009). This quality measure is very intuitive as travel time is con-
sidered as ‘‘lost’’ time. This loss can even be quantiﬁed in money terms: an early study from 1999 (Small, Noland, Chu, &
Lewis, 1999) estimated the value of each hour traveled between $ 2.6 and $ 8.1. More recent studies (Brownstone &
Small, 2005; Cirillo & Axhausen, 2006) estimate the value of travel time between $ 10 and $ 20 per hour. This range is con-
sistent with the USDOT’s guidance on the valuation of travel time in economic analysis (Belenky, 2011).
When travel time serves as the primary criterion to assess a trip, choosing the best route is a very difﬁcult task. For the
trafﬁc conditions (e.g., free ﬂow or congestion) change over time. Therefore, a currently uncongested road may be blocked
when we ﬁnally reach it. Advanced trafﬁc information systems (ATISs) such as on-board navigation devices might make
things even worse. By providing information on the current trafﬁc state and route capacities, congestion and travel times
may increase instead of decrease—especially if the provided information is incomplete (Arnott, de Palma, & Lindsey,
1991; Mahmassani & Jayakrishnan, 1991; Noland, 1997). A congestion warning for a critical road segment, for instance,i-due.de
Fig. 1. The experiment from the participants’ perspective. They were in the position of a tripmaker facing a commute downtown, and they could choose
between a high-capacity toll-road (A) and a toll-free, low-capacity main road (B). The travel time on the selected road depends on the total number of
participants choosing the same road.
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ter may be free of congestion, whereas the alternative, formerly uncongested routes become congested.
A common approach to ease congestion is adding more capacity to congested corridors by adding more lanes to existing
roads or by constructing new ones (Schrank, Lomax, & Eisele, 2011). Modern approaches even envision the application of
information and communication technologies for the same purpose (Knorr, Baselt, Schreckenberg, & Mauve, 2012; Lakas
& Chaqfeh, 2010). These strategies can be combined with introducing tolls for the newly added infrastructure. In this context,
it is interesting to ask how drivers react to such a route choice scenario. Do they ﬁnd an ‘‘equilibrium’’ strategy of which road
to use, and, if they do so, how long does it take to ﬁnd such a strategy. Does additional information improve their choice?
Unfortunately, there is lack of empirical data investigating the impact of trafﬁc information on route choice. A very com-
mon approach of collecting such data is by conducting commute surveys (Abdel-Aty, Kitamura, & Jovanis, 1997;
Mahmassani, Caplice, & Walton, 1990; Mannering, Kim, Barﬁeld, & Ng, 1994). Thereby, the results represent rather a snap-
shot of the current situation. Therefore, its explanatory power in terms of the temporal evolution of decision processes, the
role of learning, and the interaction between road users is quite limited. Besides, there is always the risk that the respondents
adapt their answer to what they believe is right or favorable (cf. the halo effect) (Schofer, Khattak, & Koppelman, 1993).
Hence, laboratory experiments have become a valuable tool to study dynamics of the route choice process in a controlled
environment (e.g., Helbing, Schönhof, & Kern, 2002; Selten, Schreckenberg, Pitz, Chmura, &Wahle, 2003, 2007). Furthermore,
laboratory experiments offer the possibility of paying the participants and coupling their pay-off to the success of their deci-
sions. This ﬁnancial incentive makes laboratory experiments much closer to reality because in reality a bad route choice
costs time and/or money, too.1
In this article we want to investigate the inﬂuence of trafﬁc information on route choice behavior by presenting the
results of three laboratory experiments—each with more than 100 participants. In all experiments the participants had to
choose repeatedly between two routes, a so-called main road and a toll road. Yet, the information provided to the partici-
pants before making their choice varied. Similar to Selten, Chmura, Pitz, Kube, and Schreckenberg (2007), the participants
were assigned a ﬁxed starting balance, and they lost the more money the more participants chose the same road. Naturally,
selecting the toll road led to an additional, demand-independent fee. The beneﬁt of the toll road was that it had a higher
capacity and, therefore, an increased demand resulted in a slower increase of the resulting travel time and expenses.
2. Experimental setup
The experiment, which was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), mimicked a real-
istic route choice scenario (The participants’ instructions can be found in Appendix A): all participants were assigned to role
of motorists who repeatedly had to travel to the same destination (e.g., the home-to-work commute). For their trip, they
could choose between two roads—a toll road and a toll-free main road (see Fig. 1). The toll serves here as a deterrent2 to
choose this road (de Palma & Lindsey, 2000). (In the context of congestion pricing, such deterrent effects are used to control1 Before designing our experiments, we have contacted a company operating a German toll road, and we asked for their experience with surveys. They told us
that they used surveys before opening the toll road to determine (a) how many respondents would be willing to use the new toll road, and (b) which price they
would be willing to pay. After the opening of the toll road, signiﬁcantly less drivers than expected used the toll road as the hypothetical situation of a survey did
not compare to the actual situation of choosing the toll road. Hence, the monetary gains/losses in our experiments are a very important aspect regarding the
results’ transferability to reality.
In this context, however, it has to be noted that the participants of our experiments received a starting balance from which the travel expenses were deducted.
Therefore, the participants left the experiment with more money than they started with, whereas in real life travel expenses are unavoidable and actual
‘‘losses’’.
2 Although tolling makes a road less attractive to drivers, this does not mean that the public opinion is per se against tolling and road pricing. The analysis of
international surveys on road pricing and tolling (Kriger, Shiu, & Naylor, 2006) revealed a more sophisticated public opinion.
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there is a parallel toll-free road, drivers are known to be very price-sensitive (Victoria Transport Policy Institute, 2014).).
After each period, the participants’ starting balance was charged by an amount proportional to the travel time on the
selected road. Moreover, they had to pay a constant amount of 30 currency units (30 euro cents) if they decided to use
the toll road. The participants knew that the travel time on either road increased with the number of participants choosing
the corresponding road, but they did not know the exact relation between road usage and resulting travel expenses. The only
additional information was that, with an equal number of travelers on both roads, the main road was cheaper.
In each realization of the experiment eight-teen participants simultaneously had to choose repeatedly one of the two
roads. In each period, the situation was identical to the ﬁrst period. However, the following information was provided for
all previous periods: the participant’s route choice in the corresponding period, the number of participants on either road,
and his/her current balance.
To study the inﬂuence of real-time pre-trip information we performed three slightly different experiments. A common
feature of all experiments is that the participants had 30 s to decide which route to take in each period. (The participants
were told that, if they did not make their decision within in this time, the toll road was automatically selected).3
 In experiment A a period ended after all participants had selected a road.
 In experiment B, all participants entered a second step after they had made their route choice. In this second step they
were informed on howmany participants intended to take either route, and they were offered the possibility to alter their
initial choice. Again, they had 30 s to conﬁrm or to alter their initial choice. (After 30 s the initial choice was automatically
conﬁrmed.)
 Experiment C was similar to experiment B, but the participants had to pay 6 currency units (6 euro cents) to enter the
second step.
There are intuitive interpretations for all of the just described experiments. Experiment A obviously represents the case
were drivers have no information on the trafﬁc state on either road. Hence, their only guide to choose a road is their expe-
rience which they gain by repeatedly deciding for one road and learning about the resulting travel expenses. In experiment B,
all participants simultaneously get identical information on the intended road usage of all participants and have the possi-
bility to correct their choice. One can think of this information as trafﬁc information broadcast by radio. In this scenario, driv-
ers can react to this message by choosing an alternative route. Yet this strategy is only promising if not too many drivers
react this way. Due to the associated fee in experiment C, just a few participants are expected to make use of the additional
information and alter their route choice. This may correspond to the situation where drivers use (partly fee-based) services
of personal navigation devices to include real-time trafﬁc information in their route planing. In this sense, experiment C can
be understood as a mixture of A and B as some drivers have additional information on the level of service on either route,
whereas the others have to completely rely on their experience.
2.1. Travel times and equilibrium states
As already stated, in each experiment np ¼ 18 participants interacted with each other. Let ntoll and nmain ¼ np  ntoll denote
the number of participants choosing the toll road or the main road, respectively. The resulting travel times on the main road
tmain and on the toll road ttoll followed from the equations3 By
them attoll ¼ ntoll; ð1Þ
tmain ¼ 3nmain; ð2Þand the resulting travel expenses for either road, ctoll and cmain, were given byctoll ¼ 30þ ttoll; ð3Þ
cmain ¼ tmain: ð4ÞBy comparing Eqs. (1) and (2), one can see that the travel time on the main road grows stronger than on the toll road with
additional participants on the corresponding road. Therefore, one can think of the toll road as a multi-lane roadway which
can satisfy a higher trafﬁc demand than the one-lane main road.
For ntoll ¼ 6 and nmain ¼ 12 the travel expenses on both routes are identical in our scenario. This distribution corresponds
the ‘‘user equilibrium’’ (UE) according to Wardrop’s ﬁrst principle (Wardrop, 1952) as travel expenses are the only quality
measure in our experiments. (From a game theoretic point of view, one may also call any such conﬁguration a pure-strategy
Nash Equilibrium.) This means that no participant can lower his/her travel expenses by changing his/her choice if all other
participants keep their initial choice.
The linear relation of Eqs. (1) and (2) deserve some critical comments: Trafﬁc is a dynamical system, and travel times
show non-linear behavior—at least in certain density regimes (Kerner, 2004). Therefore, complex mathematical models havechoosing the toll road as the default road, we wanted to ‘‘force’’ the participants to actively choose one road, as they knew that the toll road will cost
t least 0.30 euro. Indeed, in more than 99% of all cases the participants made their choice before the timeout.
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ministic relation between the observables. This is a valid assumption when the ﬂow rates are sufﬁciently small. At higher
ﬂow rates, however, a trafﬁc breakdown can occur spontaneously (i.e., stochastically) on at least one of the roads. It was
recently shown (Kerner, 2013) that, when the probability of a trafﬁc breakdown is greater than zero, then, instead of War-
drop’s principles, a breakdown minimization (BM) principle (Kerner, 2011, 2014) should be used for a route choice. Hence, it
is evident that our linear travel time functions (1) and (2) are a simpliﬁcation of reality. Despite their simplicity, they capture
the most important aspects of the travel time – road usage relation:
 With few drivers choosing a speciﬁc road, the vehicle density on this road is low, and the resulting average speed is high.
This results in low travel times.
 When more and more drivers choose the same road and, thereby, increase the vehicle density, they start hindering each
other. This lowers the average speed and increases the travel time for all drivers.
So, from the participants’ perspective, who did not know the exact travel time function (see Appendix A), the relation
between road usage and travel time was consistent with their own travel experiences.
2.2. The participants
For each experiment we performed six independent realizations (each with 18 participants). The participants were
mostly students of the Universities of Düsseldorf and Duisburg-Essen, Germany, where the experiments were conducted.
Due to the generally comprehensible design of the experiments, the participants were not required to possess a driver’s
license. Additional information on the participants are given in Table 1.
3. Results
As all experiments were repeated six times, the following results show the average values of all repetitions or of all par-
ticipants, respectively.
3.1. Road usage and choice variability
First, we study the temporal evolution of the number of participants choosing the main road nmain. Remember that the UE
(or Nash equilibrium) is at nmain ¼ 12, what the participants did not know at the start of the experiment. Therefore, the larg-
est deviation from this equilibrium value can be observed during the ﬁrst few periods (see Fig. 2(a)). There is, however, a
general tendency in all experiments to approach the equilibrium value over the course of 50 periods. During the ﬁrst ten
periods of the experiments, on average 10.9 participants chose the main road, whereas this number increased to 11.6 for
the last ten periods. This observation cannot be explained by random ﬂuctuations. (The H0-hypothesis that the proportion
of participants choosing the main road in periods one to ten and 41 to 50 is identical can be rejected on a 99%-conﬁdence
level.) For better visibility, we have added a blue trend line resulting from linear regression to Fig. 2(a). The trend lines, which
do not imply a linear relation, indicate that the equilibrium value is approached from smaller values (nmain < 12). This could
be expected as the toll road causes a smaller loss per additional road user for participants choosing this road. Hence, it is
more favorable to choose the toll road when in doubt which route to choose.
The tendency to approach nmain ¼ 12 suggests that the participants organized themselves to ﬁnd the equilibrium distri-
bution between the two routes. The beneﬁt of experience and learning reﬂects itself not only in the approach of the equi-
librium value nmain ¼ 12 but also in a decrease of ﬂuctuations between both routes. Fig. 2(b) shows the standard
deviation (SD) of the number of participants choosing the main road. Similar to Fig. 2(a), the largest values of the SD are
observed during the ﬁrst few periods before the participants gathered sufﬁcient information about the available routes.
But the experiments’ SDs distinguish in their absolute values. In experiment A they are in general larger than in experiment
B, and those of experiment B are larger than those of experiment C (averaged over all 50 periods:
SDA ¼ 2:17; SDB ¼ 1:75; SDC ¼ 1:44). This suggests that the intermediate step of experiments B and C, where participants
can change their initial choice, allows for a better coordination between participants. Fig. 3 conﬁrms this assumption. It
shows the average number of participants who changed their initial choice in each period. Obviously, this number is lowerTable 1
Overview of the participants.
Property Experiment A Experiment B Experiment C
Gender (Male/Female) 45/63 55/53 46/62
Driving license (Yes/No) 99/9 102/6 89/19
Average age 24.2a 23.4 24.6
a The age of one participant was erroneously recorded as 100 years. We have removed this data set before calculating the average age.
Fig. 2. (a) Average number of participants choosing the main road per period and (b) the corresponding standard deviation (SD) per period grouped by
experiment. For better readability and comparability, we have added the blue line indicating a linear trend. (It is not suggested that there actually exists a
linear relation.) (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 3. The ﬁgure shows the average number of participants who changed their initial choice per period. (This was only possible in experiments B and C. The
trend lines do not suggest an actual linear relation.)
Fig. 4. The box plot shows the distribution of main road user over 50 periods grouped by experiment. For experiments B and C, the plot also shows the
distributions that one would have obtained if the participants were not offered the possibility to change their initial choice.
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entered the intermediate steps per period in experiment C.) In later periods, it is probably considered less advantageous
to alter the initial route choice as the participants gain more experience.
A better insight in the effect of the intermediate steps offers Fig. 4. It shows the number of main road users for each exper-
iment and, for experiments B and C, also the hypothetical number of participants choosing the main road, if they had stuck to
Fig. 5. (a) The participants’ average travel expenses per period depending on the number of main road selections. (b) For experiments B and C, the average
travel expenses per period depending on the number of changes of the initial choice. For better readability and comparability, we have added blue lines
indicating a linear trend. (It is not suggested that there actually exists a linear relation.) The slope of the blue trend line of experiment C is much steeper
than for experiment B, as the participants had to pay for the possibility to change their choice in experiment C. (For interpretation of the references to color
in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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During the initial choice steps in experiments B and C, however, the participants chose the main road more frequently. More-
over, there is no difference in the distribution of the initial choice for experiments B and C. But the ﬁnal distribution after the
intermediate step is very different for these two experiments: in experiment C, there are only very few periods in which
more than twelve participants choose the main road.
This can be explained as follows: With the additional fee to enter the intermediate step in experiment C, only few par-
ticipants make use of this opportunity. Thereby, they know that they can effectively control the resulting distribution with
their own actions. Altogether, this leads to a very small number of periods where more than twelve participants simulta-
neously decide to choose the main road. This number is actually signiﬁcantly lower in experiment C compared to experi-
ments A and B, respectively. (H0-Hypothesis: ‘‘The proportion of periods with more than twelve participants choosing the
main road is equal in experiments C and A (or B).’’ This hypothesis can be rejected on a 99%-conﬁdence level with a p-value
of less than 0.0016 (or 0.0038).).
3.2. Individual choices: Successful, unsuccessful, and gender-speciﬁc strategies
In all experiments the primary concern of the participants was to reduce their own expenses. To do so, there were several
strategies to reach this goal (e.g., they could frequently change their initial choice, or they could constantly prefer one route
over the other). In the following, the success of such strategies is measured in terms of the subjects’ total travel expenses. As
one can see from Fig. 5, the participants’ travel expenses increased the more frequently the toll road was used and the more
often the initial choice was changed. In other words, the best strategy for a participant was to choose the main road and to
stick with this choice. This is very well illustrated by Table 2 which shows the characteristics of the 18 participants with the
lowest and highest travel expenses in each session of the three experiments.
Finally, we investigated whether there were any gender-related characteristics with respect to the participants’ behavior.
Table 3 shows how often male and female participants selected the toll road, how often they changed their initial choice, and
how often they entered the intermediate step in experiment C. Regarding the adherence to the initial choice, we did not
found statistical evidence that there was a gender-related difference in changing the initial choice. Similarly, there was
no evidence for any gender-related preferences for entering the intermediate step in experiment C. Surprisingly, female par-
ticipants chose the toll road signiﬁcantly more often than their male counterparts. (H0-Hypothesis: ‘‘There is no difference in
the frequencies of selecting the toll road between male and female participants.’’ This hypothesis can be rejected on at least a
97.5%-conﬁdence level (for experiments A and C even on a 99%-conﬁdence level). The corresponding p-values ranged from
less than 108 in experiment C to 0.016 in experiment B.) Despite the female participants’ greater affection for the toll road,
the average travel expenses of male and female participants did not differ signiﬁcantly. (Nevertheless, the average expenses
of male participants were lower in all experiments.) Other factors than the participants’ sex to explain the observed behavior
are unlikely due to the relative homogeneity of the group of participants. As they were mostly students, they had approx-
imately the same age and a similar educational background.4
4. Discussion
In all experiments, we could observe that the participants modify and change their behavior based on the information
they gather in the course of the experiment (Fig. 2(a)). This is exactly the deﬁnition of learning. Hence, learning allows them4 Of course, one can think of other socio-economic factors (e.g., personal wealth) that might also inﬂuence the participants’ choice.
Table 2
The choices made by the participants who performed best in each session compared to the ones who had the highest travel expenses. The number in the fourth
and ﬁfth columns indicates how often the participant actually changed his/her initial choice. For experiment C, the corresponding number in brackets gives the
number of times the corresponding participant entered the intermediate step where he/she could change his/her initial choice. Remember that entering this
step cost 6 currency units each time.
Total cost Changed initial choice Toll road selection
Experiment, session Best Worst Best Worst Best W orst
A, 1 1663 1879 n/a n/a 1 31
A, 2 1701 1889 n/a n/a 5 36
A, 3 1689 1869 n/a n/a 0 28
A, 4 1675 1863 n/a n/a 2 47
A, 5 1662 1882 n/a n/a 3 39
A, 6 1735 1895 n/a n/a 5 23
B, 1 1698 1878 0 21 0 38
B, 2 1750 1858 7 10 19 15
B, 3 1692 1856 0 15 0 34
B, 4 1736 1852 5 20 8 23
B, 5 1715 1867 3 15 3 25
B, 6 1656 1856 0 5 0 47
C, 1 1740 1964 0 6 (20) 5 35
C, 2 1701 2141 0 45 (48) 3 46
C, 3 1738 1946 0 9 (18) 8 28
C, 4 1704 2022 0 17 (39) 0 27
C, 5 1769 2017 0 13 (30) 3 30
C, 6 1706 1980 0 2 (23) 2 50
Table 3
The participants’ choices by sex.
Experiment A Experiment B Experiment C
Females Males Females Males Females Males
Changed initial choice n/a n/a 561 616 175 152
Selected toll road 1295 770 1028 979 1247 743
Total number of route choices 3150 2250 2650 2750 3100 2300
Entered intermediate step n/a n/a n/a n/a 397 312
Average total travel expenses 1802 1775 1794 1780 1825 1809
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deviation of the main road’s usage (Fig. 2(b)). Consequently, the participants do not only have a good idea of the equilibrium
value, but they also become more and more conﬁdent of how to achieve it. This conﬁrms results of earlier studies (Adler &
McNally, 1994; Adler, 2001; Yang, Kitamura, Jovanis, Vaughn, & Abdel-Aty, 1993) that found learning/experience being a
very essential factor in the route choice process.
Although experience drives the participants towards the UE, ﬂuctuations occur even after 50 periods and a true conver-
gence to the UE was not reached. On might object 50 periods are not enough for true convergence to be reached. However, in
a related experiment consisting of 200 periods a similar behavior was observed (Selten et al., 2007). These ﬁndings and
related results (Helbing et al., 2002; Meneguzzer & Olivieri, 2013; Selten et al., 2003) suggest that Wardrop’s UE should
be considered as an idealized concept which can only approximately be reached in reality. Besides, there are other destabi-
lizing effects in reality regarding a stable equilibrium (e.g., road works, accidents, weather). These effects, which we did not
consider in our experiments, are additional obstacles towards a steady state. Our conclusions are in complete agreement
with Iida, Akiyama, and Uchida (1992) and Mannering who wrote (Mannering, 1989): ‘‘Most existing research work assumes
the existence of trafﬁc equilibrium or, in the case of research on commuter dynamics: the existence of a steady state. [. . .]
due to random incidents (vehicle breakdowns, weather, and so on) and/or changing commuter tastes and perceptions of con-
gestion, a ‘true’ equilibrium is not realistically achievable and a steady state will be, at best, unstable, or, more likely, will not
even exist.’’
Our slightly varied experiments allow several statements on the role of pre-trip information. As Fig. 4 shows, only minor
differences in the road usage between experiments A and B could be observed. Originally, one might have expected that the
participants could use the intermediate ‘‘change-the-initial-choice’’ step for better coordination with each other. But it
seems that in experiment B the participants used their initial route choice to make a less deliberate decision as they knew
they could change it without any drawbacks. Only in experiment C, where a limited number of participants decided to enter
the intermediate step (due to the associated additional fee), a better coordination and a more effective usage of the two roads
could be observed. Here, for most participants their initial route choice was also their ﬁnal choice. Consequently, the partic-
ipants entering the intermediate step could assume that the information that they receive in this step will not change (much)
Table 4
Average travel expenses per period and the corresponding standard deviation (SD) for either road grouped by experiment. (For better comparability, the given
travel expenses do not include the additional fee for entering the initial step in experiment C.)
Experiment A Experiment B Experiment C
Avg. expenses SD Avg. expenses SD Avg. expenses SD
Main road 34.70 6.48 34.86 5.50 34.74 4.53
Toll road 37.61 2.17 37.22 1.82 37.00 1.57
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participants have access to this information. Overall, these ﬁndings give empirical evidence to computational results (Arnott
et al., 1991; Ben-Akiva, De Palma, & Isam, 1991; Noland, 1997) that have questioned the beneﬁt of additional information for
the route choice. Arnott et al. (1991), for instance, concluded: ‘‘While a single driver can beneﬁt from proprietary informa-
tion, when all drivers are informed they may end up worse off.’’ Similarly, Emmerink, Axhausen, Nijkamp, and Rietveld
(1995) found that additional information is beneﬁcial only if the share of informed drivers does not exceed 20%.
One of the most surprising results of our experiments was the strong preference of female participants for the toll road. As
there was obviously no incentive to choose this road (the additional ﬁxed user fee for the toll road might actually have been
considered as a repellent), we expected no difference in the proportions of males and females choosing either road. It is,
however, well-known that socioeconomic factors such as age, sex, or average income can inﬂuence the route choice and
related aspects (e.g., shift of departure time, inﬂuence of trafﬁc information) (Adler & McNally, 1994; Mannering, 1989;
Mannering et al., 1994). Emmerink, Nijkamp, Rietveld, and van Ommeren (1996) found that women were more reluctant
to change their choice by trafﬁc information. They suggested that women are more risk-averse than their male counterparts
with respect to their route choice.
Such an afﬁnity of women to avoid risks can be observed in various situations—not only in the context of route choice:
Numerous articles (see the review article by Croson & Gneezy (2009) and its critical discussion (Nelson, 2012)) found a gen-
eral tendency of women to avoid risks and competition in economics experiments and data from naturally occurring mar-
kets. This general behavioral pattern might explain our own ﬁndings as well: Assuming women are more risk-averse, we
expect the reliability of a route (in terms of travel expenses and travel time) to be very important to them. In our experi-
ments, the toll road fulﬁlled this requirement because ﬂuctuations in its number of users caused lower ﬂuctuations in the
resulting travel expenses (see Eqs. (3) and (4)). Thus, the ﬂuctuations in the experienced travel expenses are considerably
less pronounced on the toll road than on the main road (see Table 4).
It is important to note that such a preference has already been found in real world scenarios: Lam and Small (2001) ana-
lyzed data from a mail survey and from trafﬁc loop detectors of State Route 91 in Orange County, California. The commuters
on this route could choose between a variably tolled route and a free one. They found that the toll road was more attractive
to women than to men. Women also attached much more importance to travel time reliability. Brownstone and Small (2005)
supposed this followed from the women’s reduced scheduling ﬂexibility due to more child-care responsibilities. Based on
our own results we can reject this explanation for two reasons: (i) All participants of our experiments were informed of
the amount of time required to complete the experiment, and choosing the toll road did not result in time savings. (ii)
Due to the relative young age of our participants, we doubt that many of the female participants were involved in child-care.
The study of Brownstone and Small, however, provides further evidence for that women have a higher preference for toll
roads than men. In their study they evaluated two road pricing demonstrations in southern California (State Route 91
and Interstate 15).
5. Conclusions
In this article we have presented the results of three closely related laboratory experiments investigating route choice
behavior and the role of information. The identical general setup of the experiments allows a better comparability and facil-
itates to draw meaningful conclusions.
We admit that we simpliﬁed our experiments in some aspects. In these experiments, the travel expenses were the only
criterion by which the participants could assess the success of their route choice. In reality, the decision which route to take
typically is a multi-objective decision-making process. In addition to the travel time and expenses, travel time reliability,
number of intersections/trafﬁc lights, congestion probability, or the road categories (highway vs. arterial road) are other
aspects that possibly need to be taken into account (Papinski et al., 2009). Moreover, there are other ways to minimize travel
time. By choosing different departure times, commuters can directly inﬂuence the congestion probability and the travel time
on their route (see Mahmassani, Chang, & Herman (1986) for an experiment). In our experiments travel time and expenses
were directly correlated. As travel time is the most important criterion among the aforementioned ones, our results can be
easily transferred to real-world route choice scenarios.
We have seen that the road usage patterns are dynamic: drivers interact with each other, they evaluate their travel
expenses and adapt their behavior. This might be the reason for the clear differences between stated preference (i.e.,
response to hypothetical choices) and revealed preference (i.e., response to actual choices) studies in the literature
(Brownstone & Small, 2005).
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 Even after 50 periods, we could not observe a stable distribution of the participants among the available roads. Therefore,
we doubt the existence of a stable equilibrium point such as Wardrop’s User Equilibrium.
 Learning and experience play important roles in the route choice process. From this follows that stated preference studies
to determine road usage patterns offer only limited insight.
 Supplying identical information to all road users does not yield signiﬁcant beneﬁt to them.
 A better road usage can be achieved, however, if only few participants possess additional information.
 Female participants were found to prefer the toll road, which offered more reliability in terms of the resulting travel
expenses. It seems that women, in general, prefer reliability and seek to avoid the risk of losing time or money by a
bad route choice. (Thereby, they also pass on the possibility to save time or money.)
What are the practical consequences of our ﬁndings? The non-existence of stable equilibrium points (UE) in trafﬁc net-
works requires more sophisticated approaches regarding trafﬁc assignment and trafﬁc network analysis. Approaches relying
on Wardrop’s principles should be considered as insufﬁcient. In the light of our ﬁndings, we believe that the already men-
tioned breakdown minimization (BM) principle (Kerner, 2011, 2014) is much better suited to analyze trafﬁc networks.
In addition, we have seen that, besides travel expenses and travel time, the reliability of a route is also an important
aspect in the route’s assessment. Hence, a constant level of dense or viscous trafﬁc might be more favorable than unpredict-
able transitions from free to congested trafﬁc. This should be considered in future trafﬁc control applications.
Finally, we can conclude that the concepts of trafﬁc information distribution should be reconsidered. As we have seen,
road usage can be improved, if only few participants possess additional information. Therefore, we expect better possibilities
of trafﬁc control by providing a share of drivers with no or even wrong (e.g., travel times or congestion warnings) trafﬁc
information.
Our ﬁndings may also contribute to the development of better mathematical and computational models mimicking the
route choice process. In this context, we suggest that one should prefer such models that involve learning components
(Nakayama & Kitamura, 2001; Cascetta & Cantarella, 1991; Ozbay, Datta, & Kachroo, 2001; Jha, Madanat, & Peeta, 1998)
and that one should refrain from models showing perfect convergence towards a stable steady state (e.g., (Mahmassani &
Jayakrishnan, 1991)).
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Appendix A. Participants’ instructions
The following subsection is a translation of the instructions that the participants received at the begin of each experiment.
(To some extent the translation was shortened. For example, the rules of conduct in the laboratory (e.g., no eating) are not
printed.)
A.1. Experiment’s instructions
In today’s experiment, you are part of a group consisting of 18 participants. The experiment’s setup is identical for all
participants.
 The experiment consists of 50 periods.
 In each period you will act as a motorist who has to travel from an origin A to a destination B. To travel from A to B you can
either choose the ‘‘main road’’ or the ‘‘toll road’’ (see Fig. A.6).
 The travel expenses for the trip from A to B satisfy the following conditions: The travel expenses on both roads increase
with an increasing demand, and they decrease with a decreasing demand. With an equal demand on both roads, the travel
expenses on the main road are lower than on the toll road.Fig. A.6. Schematic sketch of your choice to travel from A to B.
Fig. A.7. User screen requesting to choose a road.
Fig. A.8. User screen offering to change the initial choice.
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 Each participant receives an initial balance of x Taler.5 One Taler corresponds to 0;01 euro.
 You do not play against a computer simulation, but you interact with the other participants. A new period starts, after all
participants have made the necessary decisions.
 To answer the question you have 30 s. If you do not press a button within this time, the toll road is automatically selected.
The following item was part of the instructions of experiment C.
 After you have made your route choice, you are offered the possibility to acquire information on how the other partici-
pants decided. In this case, you have the ability to alter your choice. To acquire this additional information and the pos-
sibility to alter your route choice, you have to pay 6 Taler (see Fig. A.8; numerical values are ﬁctitious). (You have 30 s to
make your choice; otherwise, the question will automatically answered with ‘‘No’’.)
Only if you agree to above offer, the screen of Fig. A.9 appears (numerical values are ﬁctitious). (You have 30 s to make
your choice; otherwise, the original choice will automatically be conﬁrmed.)
The following item was part of the instructions of experiment B.
 After you have made your route choice, you will receive information on how the other participants decided. Next, you
have the ability to alter your choice (see Fig. A.9; numerical values are ﬁctitious). (You have 30 s to make your choice;
otherwise, the original choice will automatically be conﬁrmed.)
Your travel expenses:
After each period the travel expenses are subtracted from your current balance. The travel expenses depend on two
points:5 Depending on the experiment, the time to complete 50 periods varied. Therefore, we adapted the initial balance so that we could guarantee average hourly
earnings of 12 euro.
Fig. A.9. User screen showing the results of the intended road usage.
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participants choosing the same road as you. It holds: The less participants choose the same road as you, the lower are your
travel expenses. (This is all information you get!)
2. If you choose the toll road, there are additional expenses of 30 Taler.
In each period you receive the following information about the previous periods in the lower part of the screen:
 the number of the period,
 the road you chose,
 your travel expenses for the corresponding period,
 the number of participants choosing the toll road and the main road, and
 your current balance.
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